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1.  Introduction:  The Social and Economic Crisis
The global financial crisis that began with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market 
in the United States spread to economies around the world at an astonishing pace. In Japan, as 
2009 began, jobs and often homes were lost with a suddenness and on a scale previously 
unknown, leaving people at a loss as to where to turn. At a time when Japan’s own societal 
sustainability was seen to be under increasing threat, an unprecedented degree of instability was 
laid bare throughout the globalized economy. At precisely this juncture, in the general election of 
30 August 2009, the long-standing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)-led coalition government 
was replaced by a Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led government in an historic change of 
administration.
Tarō Asō, the last prime minister of the outgoing LDP government, in his Special 
Address to the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos in late January 2009, 
emphasized that in order to put the world economy back onto a stable growth trajectory, 
countries with overall balance surpluses (including Japan) must shed their reliance on external 
demand and instead achieve economic growth by increasing internal consumption. He declared 
Japan’s foremost duty to be the restoration of vitality to its economy, still the world’s 
second-largest. However, as was acknowledged in the government’s 2009 Annual Report on the 
Japanese Economy and Public Finance, the slump in the Japanese economy was clearly the 
most severe among all the advanced industrialized countries. Far from fulfilling its duty, there 
was fear that Japan might block recovery of the global economy.
This was the atmosphere in which OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) Secretary-General Angel Gurría visited Japan in mid-November 2009. During 
his meetings with then (DPJ) Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and other ministers, Mr. Gurría 
pointed out that “increasing labour inputs by raising female labour force participation” is key to 
Japan’s economic recovery from the crisis and to its movement toward self-sustained growth. 
He noted that “Japan is the only OECD country, along with Korea, where the labour force 
participation rate of women with a university education is roughly the same as for those without 
an upper secondary education. Moreover, many women who do work are only part-time 
employees. In short, Japan is under-utilizing the talents of its female population” 
(http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3343,en_21571361_44315115_44088581_1_1_1_1,00.htm
l).
* Mari Osawa is a Professor at the Institute of Social Science of the University of Tokyo. The author wrote this paper 
with cooperation from a research team organized by the JICA Research Institute.
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Even before the onset of the 2008 economic crisis, there had been indications that 
Japanese society was in a precarious state. In particular, Japan was experiencing historically low 
birth and high suicide rates, symptomatic indicators of livelihood difficulties which are strongly 
correlated with each other and with strongly gendered job/income conditions and related social 
policies (Osawa forthcoming). The present paper argues that promoting gender equality and 
constructing a more equitable livelihood security system (LSS) so that people of lower status –
notably women – will be less vulnerable is indispensable for revitalizing the Japanese economy, 
for building a sustainable society, and for insuring a more stable global economy. A comparative 
gender analysis of livelihood security systems leads to this conclusion:  for Japan, more than 
for any other “advanced” economy, a radical reconstruction of LSS is absolutely essential.
In Section 2 below, the LSS framework is introduced, with its outcomes as situations of 
social inclusion/exclusion. In Section 3, income and employment disparities are analyzed. 
Income disparity has been widening, and poverty in Japan has been increasing since the 1980s. 
At around the turn of the century (i.e., 2000), the rate of relative poverty in Japan’s working-age 
population was the second highest among OECD countries, exceeded only by that of the United 
States. The non-regularization of employment for women and younger men figures in the 
underlying explanation.
Section 4 examines how social policy measures have affected these income and 
employment disparities. The mitigation effects on income disparity and poverty of Japanese tax 
and social security schemes are quite weak, and the effects of the tax policies in particular have 
worsened since the late 1980s. The relative poverty rate of “households with all adults working” 
(two-earner couples, single parents, individuals) and the relative poverty rate for children are 
higher at the disposable income (after taxes and transfers). level than at the market income level, 
which indicates that LSS has a reverse function for these households and children. With regard 
to labor policy, the temporary-labor market has gradually been deregulated and social security 
burdens have repeatedly been increased while the level of benefits has decreased. Finally in 
Section 5, the author suggests that the global imbalance which caused the current financial and 
economic crisis resulted from dysfunctional LSS in the United States, Japan and China.
2.  The Livelihood Security System and Social Exclusion/Inclusion
2-1. The framework and the actual situation
Economic and social structures relating to production, distribution and consumption 
based on the dimension of individual livelihoods are referred to in this paper as the “livelihood 
security system” (LSS). Livelihoods are secured in the so-called advanced countries by LSSs in 
which the activities of private institutions (including families, businesses, and non-profit 
organizations) are articulated with government institutions and policies, such as tax and social 
security schemes, employment maintenance policies, and labor-market regulations. The 
dysfunction or reverse function of an LSS engenders social exclusion. “Reverse function” 
denotes a system that purportedly is intended to secure the daily livelihoods of people but 
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instead actually threatens and/or excludes them (Osawa 2007a; Osawa 2007b).
The concept of social exclusion originated in France with respect to situations where a 
person cannot participate in various aspects of society as a full-fledged member due to poverty 
and income gaps, language barriers, education disparities, health inequalities, and/or barriers to 
the exercise of civil rights. In the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, the struggle against social 
exclusion was positioned as a key objective of the European Union (EU). In December 2001, 
the EU Council approved 18 common indicators of social exclusion and poverty (Bhalla, and 
Lapeyre 2004, p.6).1
In contrast to the Western European and Nordic countries, where adequate 
unemployment insurance or public assistance schemes allow workers to subsist while 
unemployed, the labor markets of most countries include “precarious segments” of workers who 
have no alternative but to accept underemployment. These precarious segments are occupied in 
involuntary part-time and temporary employment under poor working conditions and are 
partially or fully barred from access to social security (Bhalla, and Lapeyre 2004, pp.16-26, p.44, 
p.71).
Through their work, Bhalla and Lapeyre have effectively modified the EU concept of 
social exclusion, locating the unstable labor markets of developing countries within broader 
contexts of informality and extra-legality. They do not, however, discuss the actual meaning of 
“extra-legality” apart from a brief reference to absence of formal property rights (Bhalla, and 
Lapeyre 2004, p.171).
As will be argued in the present paper, social exclusion in Japan is more closely related 
to exclusion within the labor market than to the long-term structural unemployment seen in 
continental Western Europe. Within the Japanese variant, we find continuous instances of illegal 
use of temporary workers, sub-minimum wage compensation, and such extra-legalities as 
non-payment for overtime work and lack of social security coverage.
It is important to note that LSS and its function/dysfunction are not gender-neutral. In 
Japan LSS is characterized by a strong orientation toward male-breadwinners. Compared to 
other major industrialized countries, for-profit enterprises in Japan account for a huge share of 
goods and services production. Japan thus is a company-centered society, and its companies 
favor male breadwinners, i.e. fulltime male employees who are assumed to support families 
composed of a wife and children. The employment status of Japanese men, ranging from those 
in their prime to the quite elderly, still remains relatively favorable when compared 
internationally or when compared to Japanese women and young adults. Furthermore, while the 
Japanese government is a “big construction government” it is a “small welfare government,”2
                                                  
1 Indicators include: at-risk-of-poverty rate (share of persons with an equivalent disposable income below 60% of the 
median equivalent disposable income), poverty risk gap, income inequality (ratio of total income of top quintile of 
population compared with bottom quintile), long-term unemployment rate, percentage of young NEETs, etc. In 2006 
in-work poverty risk and low reading literacy of 15 year olds were added. In 2008 a list of indicators for medical 
needs and care utilization was agreed, http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/spsi/common_indicators_en.htm.
2 Since 1945 and particularly in the 1990s the public expenditure system in Japan has been characterized by the 
highest priority it places on investment in public works for economic development while the amount of social 
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and its welfare policies attach disproportionate importance to income transfers to retired male 
breadwinners.
The social insurance schemes in Japan are uneven and vertically divided. The types of 
insurance in which people enroll differ according to whether the enrollees are self-employed 
(including business owners and their family workers), employees, or unemployed; whether they 
are working in the private or in the public sector; and, depending on the size of the employing 
corporation, their working hours, annual income, and marital status, etc. Premiums and benefits 
also differ according to the insurance schemes, so these can be considered as uneven and 
vertically divided. A similar type of structure is found in the social insurance schemes of the 
continental Western European countries. The present paper’s emphasis here is on the fact that 
the standard insured person in the Japanese system is a male breadwinner and the standard 
pension benefit, therefore, is calculated as the average benefit for a full-time employee who 
works in a medium-sized or large enterprise and supports a wife and immediate family.
Public policies directed at encouraging family formation and addressing related gender 
needs are very poor. At the turn of the century (around 2000), for example, Japan’s schemes for 
supporting families and raising future generations were the weakest among OECD countries 
(Osawa 2007a).3 In particular, among female workers employment has been drastically 
irregular since the late 1980s, as discussed in Section 3 below. The ratio of women workers 
covered by social insurance for employees has fallen continuously since the mid-1970s.
2-2. How “traditional” is the male breadwinner model?
It might be helpful here to present a brief historical overview. The rapid industrialization 
and urbanization of the Japanese economy and its high growth from the late 1950s through the 
1970s established and entrenched the male breadwinner and female homemaker as Japan’s 
social norm.
Prior to that, until around 1960, most Japanese were born and raised in large extended 
families in rural settings. In that kind of environment, farm work was the highest priority for 
women. This meant that childcare had to be shared among people of diverse kinship relations 
and age groups inside and outside of the family itself, including elderly family members, young 
aunts and uncles, elder siblings, neighborhood children and visiting adults. Children were often 
socialized and trained as apprentices in other’s households. Male farmers before World War II 
performed one or more hours per day of household chores, even while working much longer in 
the fields, compared to today’s salaried workers (Osawa 2002). Thus, true Japanese tradition 
should be considered a childcare system that involves not only parents but also non-family 
services and an extended network of community support.
                                                                                                                                                    
security-related expenditures has been kept to a minimum. In short, Japan has been heavily dependent on public 
works.
3 In terms of models of livelihood security systems, we can distinguish between the “male breadwinner” model, 
prevalent in Japan and continental Western Europe; the “market oriented” model prevalent in Anglo Saxon countries 
and the “work-life balance” model typical in Nordic countries (Osawa 2007a).
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Nor are Japanese-style employment practices, with the much-vaunted three key 
elements of life-time employment (long-term stable employment), a seniority wage system for 
regular male workers, and a company-based union truly “traditional.” In the pre-war period, 
life-time employment and a seniority wage system applied only to (male) white-collar 
employees with higher than secondary level education, while labor unions were organized 
mainly by (male) blue-collar workers, sometimes horizontally across companies. The majority 
of factory workers in the pre-war period were young women in textile (silk and cotton) 
industries.
What is understood today as “Japanese-style employment practices” began to emerge 
only after the war, when trade unions organized regularly employed workers, both white-collar 
and blue-collar, on a company basis. Swayed by a surge of democratic sentiment, the unions 
demanded the elimination of status-based differentiation between the white-collar and 
blue-collar workers. Their demands called for a single door to the shop floor, a lunch hall for all 
employees, and the extension to blue-collar workers of the long-term stable employment and 
seniority wage system. However, the egalitarian fervor of the post-war labor movement, 
including reforms such as the dissolution of large-scale farmland ownership and financial assets 
and the establishment of a highly progressive tax system, did not encompass the notion of 
gender equality (see Box 1 for conditions in rural Japan).
Satisfying the trade union demands was accomplished following serious labor disputes 
in the late 1940s, and within the specific demographic situation of the time characterized 
markedly by the increasing presence of young people. The Japanese seniority wage system is 
convenient and beneficial to management as long as the age structure of the employees is 
pyramidal. This particular system was widely adopted, not to conform to the tradition of elder 
respect, but to keep overall labor costs low.
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Box 1: Are women saviors of Japanese agriculture in crisis?
Kiyoko Furusawa (Associate Professor at Tokyo Woman’s Christian University)
Whenever a society or social organization faces a critical moment and can no longer maintain itself 
under the existing order or structure, women are called to help. The agricultural sector in Japan is no 
exception. Since agriculture has been a declining sector and farmers’ incomes have lagged behind industrial 
and service sector incomes, school graduates seldom seek farm employment. Farmers themselves prefer to 
leave, at least partially, to take non-agricultural jobs. Japanese agriculture today suffers from an aging 
workforce (average 65.8 years old), unused and abandoned land (9% of the total), and falling food 
self-sufficiency (40%). Facing these economic stresses, Japanese women increasingly distance themselves
from the agricultural sector. As a result, traditional patriarchal rural families faced a serious shortage of brides 
during the 1980s and started to welcome women from other Asian countries. In this situation, rural families 
and communities were required to adjust their views on women, from being brides to being equal partners.
The government also felt the urgent need to address the problem and issued the Vision for Rural 
Women in 1992, pleading for improvement in the status of rural women. Among the measures promoted by 
the government was a Family Management Contract, which stipulates allocation to each family member of 
the workload, holidays and remuneration. One of the goals of the contract was to have women’s 
contributions recognized and quantified. This is an innovative approach to the gender issue for Japan, 
although challenges still remain as women’s rights to land/assets and men’s responsibility for housekeeping, 
childcare and nursing care are yet to be included in the contract. In 1999, the Basic Law for a Gender Equal 
Society was enacted to support women’s activities through budget allocations for training and financing.
By 2010, women’s share of the total agricultural workforce came to 53.4% according to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries (MAFF). Women in agricultural households have opened new 
marketplaces in local communities to sell farm products processed by themselves, sent organic products 
directly to urban consumers conscious of food safety, and run restaurants, orchards, farms or hostels for
‘green tourism.’ These activities are now termed ‘the sixth (1+2+3) industry’ because they are 
characterized by a synergy of farming, processing, and service provision. Businesses run by female 
farmers increased from 4,040 in 1997 to 9,641 in 2008. Women who engage in agriculture have come to 
be called ‘the saviors’ of the rural economy.
Advances in economic activities notwithstanding, little progress has been observed in women’s
participation in the decision-making processes of public and social organizations. The ratio of female
members on Agricultural Committees, local administrative bodies which discuss and decide land use 
and agricultural policy, is increasing; but as of 2009 it was still as low as 4.9%. Among board members 
of Japan Agricultural Co-operatives (JA), in 2009 only 3.0% were women. Suffering from a sharp 
decline in its membership, the JA reconsidered its policy and announced a numerical target to enhance 
female membership and leadership. Nonetheless, women face many obstacles to their participation: 
pressing farm work, heavy housekeeping duties, limited knowledge of policy and technology, 
patriarchal local traditions, and a sense of impotence in male-dominated organizations. Without gender 
equality and without further empowerment of women, Japanese agriculture will not be saved.
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3.  Income and Employment
3-1. Growing income disparity and poverty
According to the April 22, 2009 report titled “The State of Income Disparity,” submitted 
by expert members of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, three measures – the Gini 
coefficient, the relative poverty rate, and the proportion of workers earning less than 1,500,000 
JPY (about 15,000 USD) per year – clearly indicate that income disparity has been growing 
steadily since the 1980s. (Actually, the report represents the first attempt by a Japanese high level 
government office to estimate the relative poverty rate.) Relative poverty denotes an income less 
than 50% of the median equivalent income and is used by organizations such as OECD to 
compare incomes across countries. The median disposable equivalent income in 2004 was JPY 
2,900,000 (approximately USD 29,000), with households having equivalent disposable incomes 
less than JPY 1,450,000 (approximately USD 14,500) considered to be relatively impoverished 
(Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy 2009).
As relative poverty is a measure of income disparity, there might be disagreement about 
it as a criterion for defining poverty. However, according to a research by Professor Kohei 
Komamura’s group at Keio University, comparing Japan’s official poverty line (public 
assistance standard) with the OECD relative poverty standard, the latter is a viable substitute for 
the former (Yamada et. al. 2008).4 The relative poverty rate can, therefore, be considered as 
Japan’s official poverty line.
“The State of Income Disparity” includes a country-by-country comparison of relative 
poverty rates in mid-2000, based on data from the OECD Factbook 2009. This data shows that 
Japan’s relative poverty rate of 14.9% ranked fourth highest in the world, after Mexico, Turkey, 
and the United States (Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy 2009).5
A gender component to poverty was evident in the situations of elder households and 
single person households. Shirahase’s analysis of the poverty rate among single-person 
households presents the data by gender. In 2001 the poverty rate was 21.6% among male single 
person households, compared with 42.0% among female single person households. Furthermore, 
nearly half of all elderly women living alone were in poverty (Shirahase 2006, p.69).
That said, as noted in the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy report, compared 
internationally a characteristic of Japan’s relative poverty population is that among poor 
households with a working-age head-of-household (18-65 years old), the proportion with 
working members is higher than for other countries. On average in OECD countries, 37.3% of 
relatively impoverished households with a working-age head-of-household have no working 
member and 17% have two or more working members, such as dual-income couple households. 
                                                  
4 The income requirement for receiving public assistance is a concrete value selected to respect the rights of all 
citizens and ensure that each has the opportunity to maintain “the minimum standard of wholesome and cultured 
living,” as laid out in Article 25, paragraph 1 of the Japanese Constitution.
5 The document recognized that different statistics can yield different results. It reported that if the National Survey of 
Family Income and Expenditure is used instead of the Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions utilized by the 
OECD, the relative poverty rate for Japan is 9.5%, placing Japan near the middle of OECD countries.
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In Japan, those numbers are 17.3% and 39%, respectively, representing a trend reversal (Council 
on Economic and Fiscal Policy 2009). These figures mean that in Japan the risk of living in 
poverty is higher for households with working members. Escaping the cycle of poverty is 
difficult even for households with dual earners. This in turn implies the existence of working 
poor and weak earning power for women, and it leads to a discussion of employment quality.
3-2. Non-regularization of employment
According to “The Labor Force Survey” (Detailed Tabulation), the percentage of female 
employees who were employed on a non-regular basis with fixed-term contract rose from 
32.1% in February 1985 to 46.4% in February 2000 and to 54.2% in January-March, 2008. 
Over the same period, the percentage for males rose from 7.4% to 11.7% and to 18.7%. Looking 
at the age breakdown, from the 1990s, there was a large increase in non-regularized women 
workers in the 15-24 and over 45 age brackets while the non-regularized male labor force in the 
younger age bracket crept up, starting only from the year 2000.
Ironically, the Japanese economy had been recovering for several years before the recent 
economic crisis. As stated in the Government’s 2008 White Paper on International Economy 
and Trade, Japan recorded 69 months of economic growth from February 2002 until October 
2007, the longest period of continuous economic growth since World War II. Over this time, 
although real corporate earnings increased substantially neither employment nor employee real 
income showed a similar increase. Nominal compensation actually decreased by 0.1%. By 
comparison, during the economic recovery of the late 1980s, employee income increased more 
rapidly than corporate earnings.
Without an increase in employee income, consumption stagnated. With respect to real 
GDP growth, a breakdown by demand category reveals that between February 2002 and 
October 2007 60% of the growth was attributable to exports while domestic consumption 
contributed only 36%. In the 1980s, domestic consumption accounted for nearly half of GDP 
growth (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2008, Column Figure 7-1, Figure 2-2-23). In 
short, the economic recovery that preceded the recent crisis should be called a “jobless/joyless 
recovery” since it yielded large dividends for shareholders and increased executive salaries but 
did not benefit society in general.
Even through cursory analysis, it is evident that the mechanisms of economic growth, as 
well as the structure and function of income distribution, changed during the 1990s. The 
non-regularization of employment was one of the most important factors driving this change. 
The 2008 Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance analyzes annual 
changes in salaries of regular and part-time workers and in the proportion of part-time workers 
between 2000 and the first half of 2008. According to this report, salaries decreased almost every 
year compared to the same quarter of the previous year, with the growing proportion of 
part-time workers being the main contributing factor (Cabinet Office 2008, Figure 1-3-20).
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4.  The Tax Scheme and Social Policies
4-1. Extremely weak impact and declining effectiveness of the tax scheme
In addition to the problems discussed above, the Japanese government’s tax, fiscal and 
labor policies have worked to suppress salaries and consumption.
According to OECD data, in the period around the year 2000, among 17 countries
Japan’s tax and social security schemes were the least effective in reducing the relative poverty 
rate (percentage difference between relative poverty rates at market and disposable income 
levels) for the working-age population aged 18 to 65. By contrast, the relative poverty rates on 
disposable income levels were quite low in France and Germany (where poverty rates on the 
market income levels were nearly the highest) thanks to the large redistributive effects of their 
tax and social security schemes.
As shown in Figure 1, people in the lowest income quintile received cash benefits 
amounting to 2.7% of their household disposable income in Japan, compared to the average of 
4.6% in 27 OECD countries. Japanese families in the lowest income quintile paid taxes 
amounting to 1.4% of their household disposable income, compared to 1.2% in other OECD 
countries. The net transfer in Japan to the lowest quintile accounts for only 1.3% of household 
disposable income for this income group, compared to 4.0% for the OECD countries. The 
benefits received by the lowest quintile in Japan were 0.8 times as large as those received by the 
highest, compared to 2.1 times for other OECD countries (Jones 2007, p. 22). Thus, in Japan the 
richest 20% received more transfer than the poorest 20%!  In the mid-2000s cash benefits were 
3.1% and tax burdens were 1.2% of the household disposable income of the lowest income 
quintile, again showing relatively thin transfer for and heavy burden on the poorest 20%.
Figure 1: Transfers and taxes of the lowest quintile as % of household disposable income
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The percentage of those who received benefits from the government in 1999 was only 
11.4% in Japan, while the average in 16 OECD countries was 19.7%. Japan was the only 
country in which the number of beneficiaries was smaller than the number of those who were 
under the relative poverty line (Jones 2007, p.21, pp.23-24). Of the 11.4%, more than three 
quarters were pensioners (5.1% aged, 1.6% bereaved and 1.9% disabled). Old age benefits 
constitute the largest share, although the eligibility age in Japan is being raised from 60 to 65. 
Comparatively small was the figure (0.3% of the working-age population) for assistance to 
single parents (Jones 2007, p.23).
This was the situation for Japan around the year 2000, when inequality and poverty as 
calculated by market income were not significantly different from other OECD countries. Since 
that time, however, the non-regularization of employment has accelerated. The 2009 Annual 
Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance shows that during the period from the 
1980s to the mid-2000s, the progressiveness of the tax scheme was maintained and the Gini 
coefficient was improved through tax and social security schemes. But it also shows that the 
progressiveness of taxation has been decreasing since the late 1990s and that as part of this trend, 
the Gini coefficient based on market incomes has been increasing (Cabinet Office 2009, Figure 
3-2-11). While social security scheme contributions (mainly pension benefits) to improving 
income distribution have generally been growing, the impact is minimal among the working-age 
population. Since unemployment dramatically increased after October 2008, income distribution 
must even be worsening.
4-2. Reverse redistribution to children and households with all adults working
According to OECD data in 2000, the relative poverty rate of children (the proportion of 
children aged less than 18 years old who live in households below the relative poverty line) in 
Japan was 14.3%, the seventh highest among nineteen OECD countries. Moreover, a 
comparison of the 1980s, the mid-1990s, and the period around 2000 (Figure 2) shows that this 
rate has increased in Japan and also that the figures were consistently higher after tax and social 
security transfers than before, a phenomenon observed only in Japan (Whiteford and Adema 
2007, p.18).
The OECD analysis is consistent with the survey results of Aya Abe, chief researcher at 
the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (Abe 2006). In addition, the 
above mentioned report from the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, which used data from 
the OECD Factbook 2009, confirms that in 1985, 1994, 2000, and 2003, the rate of child 
poverty based on disposable income was greater than when estimated on the basis of initial 
(market) income (Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy 2009).
As for households with working age (18-65 years old) heads in the mid-2000s, the tax 
and social security schemes in Japan compared to 27 other OECD countries were again least 
effective in reducing the relative poverty rate. Actually, in Japan poverty has slightly worsened in 
households with all adults working (two-earner couples, single parents or individuals) as shown 
in Figure 3 (OECD 2009: 186).
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Figure 2: Child poverty rates in OECD countries, before and after taxes and transfers, 1980s, 
mid-1990s and around the year 2000
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Figure 3: Reduction of poverty rate by net social transfers among the working age population in 
the mid-2000s (in comparison with pre-transfer rate)
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4-3. Labor market deregulation and social security “structural reform”
Since the mid 1990s, the private sector with government support has actively pursued 
non-regularization of employment through labor market deregulation. In the early 1990s in the 
wake of the collapse of the bubble economy, business leaders began calling for the 
“restructuring of employment.” They argued for replacement of the life-time 
employment/seniority-based pay model, which was the standard for regularly-employed men in 
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large corporations, with a multiple stream employment model that would allow increased 
diversity and fluidity. In spite of the emphasis on diversity, though, the promoters did not 
envision gender-free treatment in employment.
The intention of the private sector notwithstanding, labor-market deregulation was 
offered in conceptual combination with equal employment opportunities between women and 
men. The protection of women provisions of the Labor Standards Law was scrapped in 1997 
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, revised to strengthen gender equality, entered into 
effect in April 1999 (for a brief chronology, see Box 2). Furthermore, in 1999 the Worker 
Dispatch Law was revised so that the use of dispatch workers was deregulated and no longer 
restricted to specifically listed tasks. Instead, tasks on a negative list are excluded (Osawa 2007b, 
Chapters 3 and 5). A subsequent June, 2003 revision of the Worker Dispatch Law deregulated 
the use of dispatch workers in core jobs in the manufacturing industry.
Box 2: Policy Measures for Gender Equality
 The Equal Employment Opportunity Law (1985)
 CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women), ratified 
(1985)
 The Child/Family Care Leave Law, enacted and extended (1991, 1995, 1997, 2009)
 ILO 156 Convention (Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention), ratified (1995)
 ‘Protection Provisions for Women,’ abolished from the Labor Standards Law (1997)
 The Equal Employment Opportunity Law, reformed (1997, 2006)
 The Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society (1999)
 The law preventing spousal violence and protecting the victims, enacted and strengthened (2001, 2004, 
2007)
 Gender equality perspective, integrated into the New ODA Charter as a basic policy (2003) [See Box 4]
 The National Plan of Action to Fight against Trafficking in Persons, adopted (2004) and amended (2009) 
[See Box 3]
 Medium-Term Policy on ODA (2005) [See Box 4]
 Initiative on Gender and Development, proposed by Japan in 2005 at the 49th session of UN CSW 
(Commission on the Status of Women) [See Box 4]
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Box 3: Human trafficking in Japan
Kana Takamatsu (Research Associate, Institute of Social Science of the University of Tokyo)
Japan is a major destination country for human trafficking, specifically trafficking of women and 
girls for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Recognizing the seriousness of the problem, the representative of
the Japanese government at the 2008 UN.GIFT Vienna Forum to Fight Human Trafficking argued that the 
fundamental cause of human trafficking is economic disparity between nations and, therefore, that reducing 
economic disparity through ODA and international cooperation is crucial to address the problem.
The Japanese government also stated at the Vienna Forum that Japan was implementing various 
measures to combat human trafficking at home in accordance with the National Action Plan adopted in 2004. 
(The action plan was subsequently expanded in 2009.) However, in 2009 the National Police Agency of 
Japan recognized only 17 victims and arrested 24 suspects in 28 cases. The number is quite small for a major 
destination country like Japan; it must be only the tip of the iceberg. Detecting human trafficking at the supply 
end is difficult because it is inherently an underground crime and cases such as disguised marriage and child 
adoption are increasing. Demand-side control is crucial.
The US Trafficking in Persons Report 2010 expresses concerns about forced prostitution and forced 
labor (“foreign trainee programs”) in Japan. The report points to a lack of government effort to reduce the
huge demand for commercial sex services and for child sex tourism. A similar complaint was issued by the 
ILO which noted that the entertainment industry constitutes a fundamental component of mainstream 
Japanese business culture. This kind of demand reflects individual attitudes based on gender stereotypes still 
prevalent in Japanese society and corporate culture. A nationwide survey on the perception of trafficking and 
prostitution conducted in 2006 by the National Women's Education Center of Japan suggests that, in order to 
control the demand for illegal sex in Japan, it is necessary to foster an attitude that emphasizes individuality
and diversity in human beings rather than stereotyped differences between men and women. The Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women recently expressed concern about the persistence of 
patriarchal attitudes and the deep-rooted stereotyped gender roles in Japanese families and society. These 
attitudes and stereotypes threaten to undermine the capability of women to exercise and enjoy human rights. 
The Committee also warned that the over-sexualized depiction of women in the media strengthens existing 
gender stereotypes. The mainstreaming of gender perspectives and the achievement of gender equality are 
keys to combating human trafficking and to eradicating its root causes in Japan.
The government of Japan has strengthened demand-side policies. The 2009 Action Plan includes 
measures to cultivate respect for human rights through education in schools as well as through social 
education at various maturation stages. These measures are expected to contribute to transforming people’s 
attitudes and behavior.
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With the onset of the current economic crisis, a large number of dispatch workers in the 
manufacturing industry lost jobs in a singae swoop. Figure 4 shows that after repeated 
deregulations since 1990, Japan is among the countries with the weakest regulation of its 
temporary-labor market while the degree of protection against dismissal of mid level regular 
workers has remained unchanged.
Box 4: Gender mainstreaming in Japanese ODA
Department of Public Policy, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Japan’s effort to promote gender mainstreaming in ODA has advanced in conjunction with its
efforts toward gender equality in Japan. The revised ODA Charter of 2003, the Mid-Term Policy on 
ODA of 2005, and the GAD Initiative of 2005 were milestones in the promotion of gender 
mainstreaming in Japanese ODA. They highlight gender equality as one of Japan’s basic policies. They
pledge to give full consideration to the active participation of both men and women in development, to 
step up efforts to improve women’s status in developing countries, and to ensure that men and women 
equally reap the benefits of development.
Japan’s efforts are centered on gender-conscious capacity development by relevant government 
institutions in such sectors as education, health, and economic development. Efforts also have been 
made to incorporate the gender perspective into various crosscutting issues, including poverty reduction, 
climate change, peace building, disaster management, resource management, energy, and human 
rights/security. DAC’s Peer Review of 2010 concludes that Japanese ODA has made a great progress in 
mainstreaming the gender perspective.
The major characteristics of Japan’s ODA are its long-term commitment and on-the-ground 
approach, with particular emphasis on partner capacity development. Many Japanese experts and 
volunteers remain in the partner country for an extended period; being familiar with local customs and 
practices, they work as facilitators of locally-led, sometimes unexpected, transformations. An example 
of this is a Tanzania project aimed at rural community development and agricultural technology 
improvement. Japanese experts facilitated their partners in the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture and 
participants in model communities to attend more closely to the importance of women’s roles in rice 
production. Women work longer hours than men, and yet household accounts are inequitably dominated 
by the men. Through technical training, line planting and a simple weeding instrument were introduced, 
contributing to yield improvement. After the introduction of the instrument, men increasingly took over
the work of weeding which traditionally had been done by women, thus reducing women’s workloads. 
The enhanced awareness among men of the importance of women’s roles has even induced some men 
to cook at home while their wives are out. By approaching both men and women with appropriate
gender consciousness, the JICA project contributed both to changing the relationship between the men
and the women and to improving agricultural production in rural Tanzanian communities.
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Figure 4: Labor market regulation in 1990, 1999 and 2003
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With regard to revision of the social security scheme, since the early 1990s a succession 
of “structural reforms” has been implemented that resulted in burden increases and benefit 
curtailments (Osawa 2007b, Chapters 3 and 5). 
According to the data supplied by the Ministry of Finance to the Expert Committee of 
the Tax Commission, the ratio of social security contributions (social insurance premiums and 
employers’ contributions to child allowances) to gross national income (GNI) has grown 
continuously and was expected to reach 17.5% in 2010. This is in contrast to continual decline in 
the ratio of tax burdens to GNI from 27.7% to 21.8% between 1990 and 2003 (the ratio 
increased slightly until 2007 but declined to 21.5% in 2010) 
(http://www.cao.go.jp/zei-cho/senmon/pdf/sen2kai9.pdf). Since 1998 contributions to social 
security have been on par with total national tax revenue, but in 2001 they exceeded it. The 
primary sources of the increase in social security contributions were social insurance premiums 
and the widening of the scope of incomes subject to insurance premiums. With the 2004 reform 
of the National Pension System, the employees’ pension insurance premium rate is scheduled to 
increase annually by 0.354% while the monthly flat rate premium for the National Pension Plan 
is scheduled to increase annually by JPY 280 until 2017.
On the one hand, the ratio of social security benefits to GNI, as illustrated in Figure 5, 
has been severely curtailed since 2002 (National Institute of Population and Social Security 
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Research 2009). The benefits limitation has been accomplished through a wide variety of means 
(Osawa 2007b, Chapters 3 and 5).
Figure 5: Cost of Social security benefits (% of GNI)
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The social security burden is mildly regressive and its increase has been heavier for 
lower income earners. On the one hand, there is a cap to the income on which insurance 
premiums are levied. On the other hand, as seen in the flat rate premium for Class 1 insured 
persons (non-employees) of the National Pension scheme and in the capitation premium of the 
National Health Insurance scheme, some portion is levied independently of income. In addition, 
since the user charge (co-pay) for health insurance and nursing care insurance is a fixed 
percentage of total cost (i.e. 30% or 10%), the relative burden is heavier for low-income 
individuals. The on-going “reform” of the social security scheme has met strong criticism from 
the public. Even the governmental National Commission on Social Security was forced to 
declare in 2008 that the “function of social security must be strengthened” (National 
Commission on Social Security 2008).
5.  Global Imbalance, Economic Crisis, and Reconstruction of Livelihood 
Security Systems
An analysis using a financial history database covering the past 120 years indicates that 
the frequency of crises since 1973 has been about twice that prior to 1973 (Bordo, Eichengreen, 
Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria 2001). 1973 was the year the Bretton Woods regime of currency 
management came to an end and the international monetary regime was shifted to a floating 
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exchange-rate system. It is commonly recognized that the so-called global imbalance – a huge 
current account deficit in the United States on the one side and surpluses in exporting economies 
such as Japan, Middle-Eastern countries and China on the other -- is the root cause of the wave 
of economic bubbles and crises that have pulled down nations across the globe.
The imbalance is centered on the current account deficit in the United States which has 
grown to an astronomical size under the floating exchange-rate system. The American deficit 
grew rapidly in the 1990s and particularly in the 2000s to surpass the GDP of nations such as 
South Korea and the Netherlands, exceeding $800 billion in 2006 (slightly decreasing in 2007). 
Also well known is the fact that the main cause of the rapid deficit growth in the 2000s was 
over-consumption in the household sector (Cabinet Office, Chamber of the Director-General for 
Policies 2008b).
Such a continuous and cumulative deficit is only possible in the United States because 
the dollar functions as the world’s key currency. The U. S. can pay for its imports by printing 
dollars, and since the trade surplus nations hold much of their surplus (foreign reserve assets) in 
American government bonds and other dollar-denominated securities, the dollars that flow out 
with the deficit end up being returned. This return flow of dollars has covered the American 
fiscal deficit while also heating up American securities markets. Consequently, interest rates on 
housing and consumer loans became extremely low due to the massive money supply; 
consumption rose faster than personal income, and personal debt grew faster than consumption 
(Duncan 2003, pp.77-79). The rate of American savings in 2005 was below zero for the first 
time in 72 years (Doihara 2006).
Reportedly some 40% of the economic growth during the George W. Bush 
Administration was due to growth in the housing sector. As the demand for housing from upper 
middle class and higher socio-economic strata became saturated, a shadow was cast on the 
housing bubble, which led to an increase in sub-prime lending. The total proportion of 
mortgages comprising sub-prime loans, which was no more than 5% in 1994, ballooned to 20% 
by 2006. Borrowers with sub-prime mortgages were disproportionately people of color and 
women (Fukumitsu 2005; Fishbein and Woodall 2006; Toyofuku 2009).
It is important to keep in mind here that one of the sources of over-consumption was 
medical expenditure (including insurance premiums paid by employers). According to the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), the category comprising the largest share of 
consumption in 2004 was medical expenses, accounting for 20.4%, followed by housing rent 
and food, which accounted for 14.9% each (Doihara 2006). The livelihood security system in 
the United States is unusual in that it does not include universal health insurance coverage. This 
not only results in a large uninsured population and rising medical costs but also has contributed 
significantly to the global economic crisis.
Until 2004, Japan had the largest current account surplus. With increases in oil prices, 
Japan was surpassed first by Middle Eastern countries and after 2006 by China. Even so Japan’s 
surplus has continued to grow (Cabinet Office, Chamber of the Director-General for Policies
2008b). As discussed above, Japan’s growth since 2002 has relied on its export sector, and while 
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this has produced dividends to shareholders and higher salaries for executives, it has not 
translated into a concomitant increase in jobs and wages.
Japan is unique among developed nations in having excess savings. In the course of the 
on-going economic recovery, the investment rate has remained steady while the savings rate has 
slightly increased, leading to an even larger savings surplus (Cabinet Office, Chamber of the 
Director-General for Policies 2008a). If we look either at incomes or savings, it is clear that the 
savings ability of low-income individuals and elderly households is declining while the income 
of employed individuals remains stagnant. “Over-savings” is being maintained only by 
households in the two highest income quintiles. It is thought that these well-off households, 
distrusting the public pension system and anxious about the future, have reduced consumption at 
a speed higher than the decline in their disposable income (NIRA 2008). The government’s 2009 
Annual Report on the Japanese Economy and Public Finance analyzes the relationship between 
trust in the public pension system and savings rate in eleven European countries and Japan, and 
it reveals that countries with less trust in their public pension system tend to have higher savings 
rates (Cabinet Office 2009, Figure 3-3-17).
Increased foreign reserves held by current account surplus countries has led to a rapid 
increase in demand for AAA-rated American financial assets, particularly on the part of private 
institutional investors seeking higher short-term returns than they can get from treasury bonds. 
This investment behavior stimulated the securitization of financial commodities, including 
sub-prime loans (Ikeo 2009). If growing income disparities and deficiencies in social security 
schemes, along with anxiety about the future, have led to under-consumption and over-saving in 
China and Japan, then it follows that the livelihood security systems of these countries have also 
contributed to the global economic crisis.
This is why this author insists that the establishment of a fairer and more gender-equal 
livelihood security system – one which guarantees decent lives for less privileged people, 
notably women – is necessary both for revitalizing Japan’s economy and society and also for
maintaining stability in the global economy.
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